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- Written by: John C Burke
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Further Analysis of Mnangagwa’s Policies:
This Article is a continuation of a Question of Talent within Zanu PF and their 'Administration (see previous Article CLICK HERE)
Analysing Emmerson Mnangagwa’s policies as president of Zimbabwe since November 2017 involves examining their intent, implementation, and outcomes across key areas: economic management, governance, infrastructure, agriculture, and foreign relations. The focus here is on their practical impact, drawing from observable results rather than stated goals alone, and situating them within Zimbabwe’s challenging context—marked by decades of decline under Robert Mugabe, international sanctions, and domestic political tensions.
Economic Management
Mnangagwa’s flagship economic policy, encapsulated in the “Zimbabwe is Open for Business” mantra, aimed to attract foreign investment and stabilize the economy post-Mugabe. Key initiatives include:
- Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP, 2018-2020): Led by Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube, this austerity-driven plan sought to cut public spending, remove subsidies, and introduce a new currency (the RTGS dollar, later replaced). It included a controversial 2% tax on electronic transactions to boost revenue. Implementation faltered due to public backlash—fuel price hikes in January 2019 sparked deadly protests—and persistent currency instability. Inflation soared to over 500% by 2020, eroding purchasing power.
- Currency Reforms: The reintroduction of the Zimbabwean dollar in 2019 (abandoning the multi-currency system) and the launch of the gold-backed Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) in April 2024 aimed to curb hyperinflation and black-market trading. While the ZiG has shown early signs of stabilizing exchange rates, public trust remains low due to past currency collapses, and parallel markets persist. Real GDP growth was 8.5% in 2021 (a post-COVID rebound), but it slowed to 3% by 2023, per World Bank estimates, far below the 10% annual target of Mnangagwa’s “Vision 2030” for upper-middle-income status.
- Outcome: Economic policies have failed to deliver sustainable growth or investor confidence. FDI inflows remain negligible (e.g., $340 million in 2022, per UNCTAD), dwarfed by regional peers like Zambia ($1.1 billion). Unemployment exceeds 80% informally, and poverty affects over 70% of the population, per ZimStat 2023 data. Talent in design exists—Ncube’s academic credentials suggest capability—but execution is undermined by corruption and lack of structural reform.
Governance and Political Administration
Mnangagwa promised a break from Mugabe’s authoritarianism, pledging democratic reforms and reconciliation:
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Blessed Mhlanga Still Detained
As of today, March 21, 2025, Blessed Mhlanga has not been released on bail. The High Court, presided over by Justice Gibson Mandaza, denied his bail appeal, upholding the earlier decision by Harare Magistrate Farai Gwatima. Mhlanga, a senior journalist with Heart & Soul TV (HStv) and Alpha Media Holdings (AMH), has been in custody since his arrest on 24th February 2025, facing charges of inciting violence under Section 164 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. These charges stem from his interviews with war veteran Blessed Geza, who criticized President Emmerson Mnangagwa and called for his resignation.
Implications for Journalism in Zimbabwe
The continued detention of Blessed Mhlanga carries significant implications for journalism in Zimbabwe, reflecting broader challenges to press freedom and freedom of expression: 6 key Issues Raised below
- Chilling Effect on Journalists: Mhlanga’s arrest and the denial of bail send a strong message to journalists that covering dissenting voices or politically sensitive topics can lead to severe repercussions. This could foster self-censorship, as media practitioners may avoid reporting on controversial issues to protect themselves from legal harassment or imprisonment.
- Erosion of Press Freedom: Despite constitutional guarantees under Section 61, which protect freedom of expression and media rights, the use of criminal laws to detain journalists undermines these protections. The case highlights a pattern of increasing state intolerance toward independent journalism, particularly since Mnangagwa’s re-election in 2023, as noted by media watchdogs like Reporters Without Borders.
- Criminalization of Journalism: The framing of Mhlanga’s work—interviewing a public figure—as incitement to violence blurs the line between journalistic duty and criminal activity. Media advocates, including the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), have condemned this as an attack on the profession, arguing that journalism is being treated as a terrorist or subversive act rather than a democratic necessity.
- Impact on Public Discourse: By silencing journalists like Mhlanga, the government restricts the flow of information and stifles public debate on critical issues such as governance and economic challenges. This limits citizens’ ability to stay informed and hold leaders accountable, weakening democratic processes.
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- Written by: John C Burke
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The Size of the Diaspora – GROK3 Estimation Considerations
Estimating the size of Zimbabwe’s diaspora, particularly the figure of 900,000 often cited from the 2022 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) census, is fraught with challenges due to inconsistent data, the prevalence of informal migration, and the significant role of South Africa’s informal economy. Let’s break this down to assess the accuracy of this estimate and why South Africa’s informal sector alone might suggest a higher number.
ZimStat’s Estimate: 900,000
The ZimStat figure of 908,913 Zimbabweans living abroad, derived from the 2022 census, is based on household reports of relatives living outside the country. Of this, 773,246 were reported in South Africa, with smaller numbers in the UK (23,166), Botswana (40,000), and other nations. This data collection method—relying on family members’ responses—introduces potential undercounting, as it misses undocumented migrants, those who severed ties with home, or whose families underreported for various reasons (e.g., fear of scrutiny). The census provides a structured snapshot but struggles to capture the fluidity and opacity of migration patterns, especially in informal contexts.
South Africa’s Informal Economy and Migration
South Africa hosts the largest share of Zimbabwe’s diaspora due to proximity, historical labor ties, and economic disparities. The informal economy—estimated at 24.9% of South Africa’s GDP, or roughly $240 billion in PPP terms—employs millions, including many undocumented migrants. Zimbabweans, fleeing economic collapse (e.g., 80%+ currency depreciation in 2023) and unemployment (officially 9.3%, likely higher in reality), are drawn to this sector for jobs like street vending, construction, and domestic work, which evade formal registration.
Official South African data from the 2011 census recorded 672,308 Zimbabweans, a number experts consider outdated and conservative given subsequent migration waves, especially post-2017 after Mugabe’s ousting. Estimates from other sources vary wildly:
- The International Organization for Migration (IOM) suggests up to 3 million Zimbabweans in South Africa alone, factoring in undocumented flows.
- Academic and civil society estimates often place the figure between 1-1.5 million, with some outlier claims as high as 15 million (likely exaggerated).
- Posts on X and media anecdotes (e.g., Helen Zille’s 2019 claim of 2 million) reflect public sentiment of a larger presence, though these lack rigorous backing.
The informal economy’s scale—absorbing workers without legal documentation—means many Zimbabweans bypass official counts. For instance, the 2009-2012 Documentation of Zimbabweans Project regularized 245,000, yet many remained outside this framework due to distrust or ineligibility. With South Africa’s total immigrant population estimated at 2.9 million (2020 UN data), of which Zimbabweans are a plurality (24% per 2011 census), a figure exceeding 1 million in South Africa alone aligns with informal sector dynamics.
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ELECTORAL REFORMS:
A MUST REQUIREMENT FOR A FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE.
Most Zimbabweans have understood the unfair handling of the Zimbabwe Elections by ZEC (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission), which we now know are designed to keep ZANU PF party in power through a rigging process. Therefore, we call for a substantive electoral reform in Zimbabwe.
ZEC declared the elections (August 2023) free and fair despite overwhelming evidence of rigged process, making it clear the reality that it is not a neutral organisation. The organisation is controlled by ZANU PF party.
Election Observers 2023 Final report of the Commonwealth highlighted some flaws in what they witnessed in the following statements;
- Observers witnessed tables set up in close proximity to some polling stations in Harare and Bulawayo cities by an organisation called Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ),
- and received reports that members of the organisation were allegedly recording the names and ID of voters.
- They also noted that members of FAZ were conducting citizen observation.
- Their presence fuelled allegations of voter intimidation, since, FAZ is associated with ZANU PF.
They also noted that all three ballot boxes were similar in appearance, which may have caused confusion for voters when trying to drop ballot papers in the right boxes. To assist voters in the voting process and to avoid misplaced ballot papers, ballot boxes should be different colours, corresponding to the colour of the ballot papers.
They observed, in some areas particularly Harare and Bulawayo the polling process started late. In a few instances, ballot papers were not delivered until the afternoon, with one case experiencing delays up to 19:30hrs. These delays could have influenced voter turn out, especially in these densely populated urban areas, and may have caused frustration among voters.
ZANU PF party members and their party president, ED Mnangagwa, are always telling the public on their refusal to agree on reforms, "we can't agree to reform our ourselves out of power." they boast/tease. ZANU PF party's refusal to do the right thing is noted in the 2018 Zimbabwe COG Report recommendations;
- Total recommendations 54.
- Not implemented 27.
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- Written by: Questions by J Burke, ZHRO - Research Answers GROK3
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Step One: Estimating "Days in Prison" {or on remand for sentencing, bail or even charges}
X.com GROK3-Link 24th November 2017 to 1st March 2025;
Estimating the total number of "days in prison or on remand" for activists, opposition members, and journalists in Zimbabwe during Emmerson Mnangagwa's term in office (from November 2017 to March 1, 2025) is a challenging task due to the lack of comprehensive, centralized data and the sheer volume of cases involved. However, based on available reports from human rights organizations, news outlets, and official statements, it is possible to piece together a rough estimate by aggregating known instances and extrapolating where data is incomplete. Let’s approach this systematically, acknowledging the limitations and grounding the estimate in documented examples.
Mnangagwa assumed power on November 24, 2017, following a military coup that ousted Robert Mugabe. From that date to today, March 1, 2025, approximately 2,654 days have elapsed (accounting for leap years: 2018 had 365 days, 2019 had 365, 2020 had 366, 2021 had 365, 2022 had 365, 2023 had 365, 2024 had 366, and 2025 has 60 days up to March 1). During this period, numerous reports highlight a pattern of arrests, detentions, and prolonged pretrial remand targeting critics of the government, particularly from the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), Transform Zimbabwe, and other activist groups, as well as journalists like Hopewell Chin’ono.
Key Documented Cases
Let’s start with some high-profile examples where the number of days in detention is explicitly reported:
- Job Sikhala (CCC Opposition Leader): Arrested June 14, 2022, and released January 2024 after 595 days in pretrial detention at Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison on charges of inciting public violence and obstruction of justice. This is one of the longest recorded detentions under Mnangagwa’s term.
- Hopewell Chin’ono (Journalist): Arrested multiple times between 2020 and 2021. Reports indicate he spent approximately 94 days in detention across three arrests (e.g., 45 days in 2020 related to the July 31 protests, plus additional periods in 2021). Amnesty International notes over 80 days between July 2020 and January 2021, but cumulative totals suggest slightly more.
- Jacob Ngarivhume (Transform Zimbabwe Leader): Arrested July 23, 2020, and spent 45 days in remand prison before bail. Later arrested April 2020, convicted, and sentenced to 48 months (with 12 suspended), serving roughly 8 months (approximately 240 days) until December 2023. Another arrest on August 2, 2024, led to 82 days in detention until October 23, 2024. Total documented: ~367 days.
- Jameson Timba and 34 CCC Activists: Arrested June 16, 2024, and held until November 27, 2024, when they received suspended sentences. This equates to 164 days each. For 35 individuals, that’s 5,740 days collectively.
- June 16, 2024, CCC Arrests (Broader Group): Over 70 people arrested at Timba’s home. Assuming all were detained for the same 164 days (some reports suggest a few were released earlier), this could be 70 × 164 = 11,480 days. However, subtracting the 35 above (to avoid double-counting), an additional 35 people yields 5,740 more days.
Other Notable Cases:
- Fadzayi Mahere (CCC MP): Detained 7 days in January 2021.
- Tsitsi Dangarembga and Julie Barnes: Arrested July 31, 2020, with short detentions (exact days unclear, likely 1-2 days each).
- Makomborero Haruzivishe: Sentenced in March 2021 for inciting violence, with pretrial detention of uncertain length but likely months, followed by a 1-year sentence (~365 days total).